Illicit trafficking of radioactive materials in Paraguay

Dr. Juan Francisco Facetti
Institute for Strategic Studies
Ministry of Defence - Paraguay

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Outline

Present Situation, sector Strategies and policies

Threats

Fragmented Nature of Solutions

Conclusions & Areas for Further Activities

Strategies & Policies

2000 National Defence Strategy. Outlines the institutional, legal framework and national interest and threats for the nation

- 2005 Plan on internal security
 - Aimed at increasing the security in PY
 - Strengthening of the police forces, Prosecutor Office; Criminalistics; and the military. Colombia Government co-operation with PY security institutions and & numerous stakeholders
- 2006: New Objective (PNS): to prevent extremist groups from pursuing nuclear and radiological terrorism.

International Legal framework

- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment
- Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
- Convention on Nuclear Safety
- Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (INFCIRC/663)

Legal Framework

- Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (INFCIRC/663)
- International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (Safety Series No. 115)
- Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 2005 Edition (Safety Series No. TS-R-1)
- Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety—Requirements (Safety Standards Series (No. GS-R-1)
- Emergency Notification and Assistance Technical Operations Manual (ENATOM); Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations (JPLAN); IAEA Response Assistance Network (RANET 2006)
- Safety Requirements on Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2)

International Conventions

- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (UNGA Resolution 59/290) (2005)

Regional Agreements

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

- 1373 (2001), Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
- 1540 (2004), Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Tlatelolco

- TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE **CARIBBEAN**
- Opened for Signature: 14 February 1967.
- Entered into Force: 25 April 1969.
- Number of Signatories: 33 states.
- Number of Ratifications: 33 states.
- **Duration:** The treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely.
- On 23 October 2002, the Tlatelolco Treaty came into force throughout the region when Cuba, deposited its instrument of ratification.

Threats: irregular illegal/terrorist groups?


- Since 2005 to 2008 border police intercepted at least 20 illegal shipments of Am, Cs, and Co sources from/to South America to North American countries.
- FARC Colombia: seizure of 30 Kg. of depleted U

Some of them were intended to be commercialized to illegal groups or to extortion the material owners or national authorities.

Economic Impact of "New Terrorism"

- Impact of 9/11
 - » Insurance industry lost \$30 to \$58 billion
 - » Total cost to New York City estimated at \$82.8 to \$94.8 billion
 - » 1.2 million jobs lost
 - » Global tourism down by 2.6 per cent
- Impact of FARC in Colombia
 - Violation of human rights (hostages-families)
 - Continue flux of narcotics to US / Europe
 - Lost of human capital (migration to other countries)
 - Cost of war against FARC
 - > Spill over effects violence
- Impact of Bali, Limburg, Ryad, and India attacks

Domestically Challenges Can Only be Met Collectively



Measures to prevent, protect and respond to the theft or malicious acts involving nuclear and radioactive material

Planning: INSServ Missions,

Internal process

Internal Security Strategy

PLAN RER

Strategy of National Defence

Implementing the PPP IAEA-Bilateral-Own resources

Measures to prevent, protect and respond Cont`

- I. Physical protection of radiological material and facilities
- II. Detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials
- III. State systems for radioactive material accountancy and control
- IV. Security of radioactive material
- V. Assessment of safety/security related vulnerability of radiological facilities
- VI. Response to malicious acts, or threats thereof
- VII. Adherence to and implementation of international agreements, guidelines and recommendations

VIII. Nuclear security co-ordination and information management

Present Status of efforts

 Strengthening the institutions responsible for nuclear and radiological regulation and security (Judiciary, Prosecutor Bureau, Customs and Police).

Prevention and Intelligence

Equipments for D&R (front-line officers)

Nuclear Forensic (bilateral agreements)

Prevention, Detection and Response

- Transferring knowledge and know-how:
 - workshops, training,
 - Requesting assistance to the IAEA in drafting legislation,
 - Assistance by bilateral donors in institutional strengthening and knowledge transfer
 - Adopted reference material for the assessment and drafting our national N&R legislation

Strenghthening of the Legal Framework

Elements relating to security

- Regulatory Authority
- Licensing
- Inspection
- Enforcement
- Criminalization
- International Cooperation
- Import/Export Controls

Regarding the UN CHARTER - Chapter VII-

- Prevention and suppression of terrorist financing (creation of the Secretary for anti money laundryillegal money transfers to other regions)
- Prevention and criminalization of terrorist acts (Penal Code)
- International cooperation (with other countries and UN Agencies) in order to strengthen the global response to this challenge and threat to international security

Activities under implementation

Legal and Regulatory Framework (some examples)

- Review the national security and defence policy and establish a national strategy for security and defence. (Law 1337/95).
- Creation by law of the N&RRA under Executive Branch/MOFA.
- Revision of relevant Paraguayan laws and regulations
- Review update the authorization process of relevant installations

Activities under implementation Prevention and Intelligence

- Establishing State's threat assessment
- Update inventory of radioactive sources
- Define strategy for waste management.
- Return currently existing disused radioactive sources to the manufacturers

Activities under implementation

Detection

Provide equipment for front line officers.

Basic conditions:

- Selected the locations that pose the greatest threat.
- Arrange for a programme for training staff at these locations.
- Develop procedures for instructing front-line officers on measures for responding when radioactive material is detected;
- Make available for front-line officers reliable technical support in a timely manner; and
- Develop procedures and arrangements to maintain and periodically calibrate the radiation detection equipment.

Activities under implementation Response

- Approved the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (Plan RER).
- The Ministry of Defence (coordinator of the CMG) will review the plan and procedures for the response to seized nuclear and other radioactive materials;
- Implement the provisions of the plan and procedures;
 and
- Test the plan to identify any inadequacies and verify its effectiveness.

Conclusion

 Responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the Paraguayan State

 Under a modern regulatory agency we will effectively recognize the interface and interrelations between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards as well as liability for nuclear damage No single international instrument address nuclear security in a comprehensive manner

 Improving security systems domestically will contribute to a strengthened and more wide system of nuclear security global level

Q & A